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Abstract 
     It is shown that an equiprobability hypothesis leads to a scenario in which it is possible to 
predict the outcome of a single toss of a fair coin with a success probability greater than 50%.  
We discuss whether this hypothesis might be independent of the usual hypotheses governing 
probability, as well as whether this hypothesis might be assumed as a result of the Principle of 
Indifference.  Also discussed are ways to implement or circumvent the hypothesis. 
Introduction 
     Some mathematical results are surprising, such as the Birthday Problem.  Some mathematical 
results are genuinely startling, such as the Banach-Tarski Theorem or Smale’s proof that a sphere 
can be turned inside out.  The Banach-Tarski Theorem is startling because an apparently self-
evident hypothesis, the Axiom of Choice, leads to the conclusion that it is possible to double the 
volume of a sphere through decomposition and rigid motions.  In this paper, we discuss an 
equiprobability hypothesis that appears to lead to the conclusion that it is possible to predict the 
outcome of a single toss of a fair coin with a success probability greater than 50%. 
     Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery ([2]) have shown that there are dynamical biases in the 
physical process of flipping a coin.  Their approach relies on the physics of the problem.  Ours 
depends on hypotheses and deductions.  
 
Section 1 – Blackwell’s Bet 
   You are faced with a choice between two identical envelopes, each one containing a different 
sum of money.  Your goal is to choose the one with the larger sum of money, and so you 
randomly select one of the envelopes and count how much money is in it.  You are then allowed 
to switch your choice for the contents of the other envelope.  Should you? 
     This problem, known as Blackwell’s Bet ([3]), appears to be a 50-50 choice. The name for 
this problem originates from a result of Blackwell ([1]), which can be used to improve the 
probability of guessing correctly.  Select an independent random number from the positive reals 
to be used as a pointer.  If the pointer is greater than the amount of money in the envelope 
already opened, switch.  Otherwise, stick with your original choice. 
     The mathematics is straightforward.  Let G denote the greater amount and L the lesser 
amount.  Let p be the probability that the pointer is less than L, and let q be the probability that 
the pointer is greater than G.  Assume that the two envelopes are equally likely to be selected 
initially.  The probability that L was selected and the pointer is greater than L, indicating that you 
should correctly switch envelopes, is ½ (1-p).  The probability that G was selected and the 
pointer is less than G, indicating that you should correctly not switch envelopes, is ½ (1-q).  The 
sum of these two probabilities is ½(2-p-q) = 1 - ½(p+q).  This is the probability of a successful 
guess, and is greater than ½ assuming any pointer distribution for which the pointer has a 
positive probability of falling in any open interval. 
    There is a scheme by which a coin flip can be integrated with the Blackwell mechanism in 
such a way that there is a probability of greater than 50% of correctly guessing whether the coin 
landed heads or tails.  Agree that the two envelopes are to be labeled “heads” and “tails”, and 
that the greater amount of money is placed in the envelope corresponding to the outcome of the 
toss.  This results in what might be called a “postdiction” – there is a greater than 50% chance of 
correctly guessing how the coin actually landed by opening an envelope and selecting an 
independent pointer to guess which envelope - “heads” or “tails” - contains the greater amount. 
   This raises an interesting question – can one construct a Blackwell’s Bet type mechanism 
which can predict the result of a yet-to-be-flipped coin with probability greater than 50%? 
Section 2 – The Random Railroad 
     The Random Railroad is a recasting of the idea of a random walk.  The Random Railroad has 
stations 1 unit apart (although the distance specification is traditional rather than essential to the 
argument) numbered using successive integers increasing from west to east.  Each time the train 
stops at a station, the engineer flips a coin; if the toss outcome is heads the train proceeds one 
station to the east, and if it is tails the train proceeds one station to the west. 
     A passenger goes to sleep on the train.  When he wakes up, the train is stopped at a station, 
and he hears the conductor announce that the next stop is station 4 – but there is no indication of 
his present location.  We will assume that the passenger can discern which way is east. Under the 
assumption that he is at station 3 or station 5 with equal probability, he can use an independent 
pointer to guess the direction in which the train is departing.  If the pointer is to the west of his 
current location, he guesses that the train is departing to the west.  If it is to the east of his current 
location, he guesses that the train is departing to the east.  Successfully guessing the direction of 
travel is equivalent to successfully guessing the outcome of the coin toss.  
     The equal probability hypothesis described in the previous paragraph is central to the 
argument, and we shall outline some of the possible justifications for this at the end of this 
section. 
    The proof that the probability of a successful guess is greater than 50% is essentially identical 
to the proof of the same statement with regard to Blackwell’s Bet.  Using the station numbers 
above without loss of generality, let p be the probability that the pointer is less than 3 and q the 
probability that the pointer is greater than 5.  The probability that he is at station 3 and guesses 
correctly that he will depart to the east is ½(1-p); similarly the probability that he is at station 5 
and guesses correctly that he will depart to the west is ½(1-q), and so again the probability of a 
successful guess is 1- ½(p+q).  If we let r=1-(p+q), then r is the probability that the pointer will 
fall in the gap between the two stations east and west of the destination.  Then p+q = 1-r, and so 
1 – ½(p+q) = 1 – ½(1-r) = ½ (1+ r).  So the probability of a successful guess can be regarded as 
the sum of ½ and half the probability that the pointer falls in the gap between the two possible 
stations of origin. 
     There is, however, a subtlety in this particular problem that does not appear in the two 
envelope version of Blackwell’s Bet.  In Blackwell’s Bet, there is no problem comparing the 
pointer with the money in the envelope, because doing so does not totally reveal which envelope 
has the greater amount, even though the Blackwell technique of using the pointer does improve 
the probability of guessing which envelope holds the greater amount.  However, in this Random 
Railroad problem one is not allowed to make a numerical comparison between pointer and 
station number, because that would presuppose knowledge of the station number. Knowing the 
station numbers of both current location and destination obviously enables knowledge of the 
direction of approach to the destination with complete accuracy.  Consequently, the passenger 
must only be able to tell whether the pointer is east or west of his current location, without being 
able to deduce the station number from it. 
    From a physical standpoint, this is not difficult.  The passenger can use any independent 
pointer that is east or west of his current location – a flash of light, a bird, anything.  There are 
ways of simulating this without requiring the passenger to make numerical comparisons.  We 
shall postpone the discussion of this until the next section. 
    Notice that it is the very ambiguity of the passenger’s current location – NOT knowing 
whether he is at station 3 (west of the destination) or station 5 (east of the destination) – that 
enables him to improve the probability of a successful guess to more than 50%.    If the 
passenger simply knows he is at station 5, and does not know the destination, the pointer does 
not enable him to guess the direction of travel more than 50% of the time, as he would be 
guessing the probability that a randomly selected number would be greater or less than 5. 
     The example presented in this section is also a postdiction of the result of flipping a coin.  In 
order to have an actual prediction of the result of flipping a coin, we must guess whether the coin 
lands heads or tails before it is flipped. 
The Equal Probability Hypothesis 
    The hypothesis that the train starts from station 3 or station 5 with equal probability is central 
to the proof – and to subsequent discussions.  We see several possibilities regarding this 
hypothesis. 
    (1) It is simply a hypothesis that can be made about the system we are examining, much as the 
Axiom of Choice is a hypothesis made prior to the proof of the Banach-Tarski Theorem.  The 
Axiom of Choice has been shown to be independent of many systems of formal logic; perhaps 
this hypothesis is similarly independent as well.   
    (2) It is a consequence of the Principle of Indifference, which is a principle similar to Occam’s 
Razor.  The Principle of Indifference states that in the absence of any information about the 
probability of different outcomes, each outcome should be assumed to have an equal probability. 
    (3) There are systems in which this hypothesis can be shown to be valid.  Example 1, given at 
the end of this paper, appears to demonstrate this. 
    (4) There are systems in which this hypothesis may not be needed.  . 
Section 3 - Next Stop: Willoughby 
    We now confront the problem of deciding whether the pointer is east or west of our current 
location without making any sort of numerical comparison.  Assume that, from the standpoint of 
the passenger, the stations are identified by name rather than number.  The passenger has an 
alphabetical list of station names, and a computer has the list of station names in west-to-east 
order; that order not being known to the passenger. 
     While the train is stopped, the passenger looks at the name of the station – Hooterville.  The 
engineer flips the coin, and the conductor informs the passengers that the next stop is 
Willoughby.  Looking at the list of stations, the passenger types one of them, such as Clarksville, 
into the computer. This choice is made independently and randomly, and requires only a pointer 
distribution which assigns a positive value to each station. 
     All the conditions needed for the computation in Section 2 to be correct have been fulfilled.  
Once again, the passenger assumes his departure station (Hooterville) is east or west of his 
destination (Willoughby) with equal probability.  However, he knows the destination (analogous 
to station 4 in the preceding example), and is able to choose an independent pointer which 
enables him to guess correctly with probability greater than 50% whether the train is headed east 
or west.  There are two critical elements – equiprobability of current location relative to the 
destination, and ability to choose an independent pointer which can be assessed as either east or 
west of the current location – and both are satisfied here. 
Section 4 - Coin Toss Outcome Prediction: The Second Passenger 
    While the train is at the current station, but before the engineer flips the coin to decide the 
direction of travel, another passenger sits down beside the passenger in the previous section.  He, 
too, types the name of one of the cities on the alphabetical station list into the computer, and 
obtains a pointer – but he does so before the engineer flips the coin.  The second passenger can 
therefore make a prediction about the direction the train will travel – that is, whether the toss 
outcome will be heads or tails – before the coin is tossed.  But how good is this prediction? 
    Before the train starts to move, the conductor announces that the destination is Willoughby.  
The first passenger starts to type a name into the computer, but is interrupted by the second 
passenger, who says, “Save yourself some trouble – use my pointer.”  So both passengers will 
make the same prediction, as both are simply comparing the independent pointer’s location with 
the current station. Since the first passenger will be right more than 50% of the time, so will the 
second passenger. 
    One might argue that there are two possible destinations for the train – Willoughby and 
whatever station is on the other side of Hooterville.  What if the train went to that other station 
instead?  From the standpoint of both passengers, the name of the destination does not matter, as 
the train is equally likely to be on either side of the destination – whatever its name may be.  No 
matter what the destination, the two critical elements – from the standpoint of both passengers – 
are fulfilled: the current location could be on either side of the destination with equal probability, 
and an independent pointer can be selected which can be discerned to be east or west of the 
current location. 
    There is, of course, another way to look at this scenario.  The train is at Hooterville, and one 
possible destination is to the east, the other possible destination is to the west.  Therefore, the 
train is certainly to the west of the eastern possible destination, and to the east of the western 
possible destination.  That would be the point of view of an omniscient onlooker.  But the 
passengers have a different perspective; they have no way to know whether the train is east or 
west of its destination, whatever that destination may be.  Similarly, in Blackwell’s Bet, an 
onlooker with X-ray vision can tell how much money is in each envelope, but the person 
confronted with the choice of envelopes cannot.  The best he can do is improve his probability of 
guessing correctly, and the passengers are in a similar situation. 
Section 5 – An Example 
    Although the presentation has assumed that the Random Railroad consists of an east-west 
track, making this assumption creates certain difficulties.  If the track is finite and the train is at 
an end station, there is only one direction it can go, and so the direction is not determined by the 
coin toss.  If the track is infinite, the assumption that the two possible stations of origin are 
equiprobable cannot be made for all destinations, as there is no uniform probability distribution 
on the integers.   
    We now outline an approach to overcoming the equiprobability problem. 
Example 1  
    Assume stations 0 through N are equally spaced clockwise around a circular track.  For 1 < k 
< N, let pk be the probability that the pointer lies on the circular track between station k-1 and 
station k.  Let p0 be the probability that the pointer lies on the circular track between station N 
and station 0. Although we will use numerical stations to make computations easier to 
understand, the passenger(s) will always be required to identify stations by name.  The coin toss 
outcome determines whether the train moves clockwise or counterclockwise. 
    To use the pointer, assume that the passenger is at some station, and has chosen a station from 
the alphabetical list of stations as described in Section 3.  The computer generates a pointer as in 
Section 3.  The computer then chooses a station roughly diametrically opposite the passenger’s  
station, which we will refer to as the reference station RS.  The RS and the passenger’s station 
divide the circle into two arcs.  The passenger will guess that the train will proceed towards the 
RS along the arc in which the pointer lies. In the diagram below, the passenger guesses the train 
will proceed CLOCKWISE in the direction of the arrow.  In other words, the passenger is 
guessing that the destination is the next stop CLOCKWISE. 
                                                         
    We assume that the train has an equal probability of being at any station. This would be the 
consequence of random movement of the train. Observe that this arrangement completely 
passenger 
pointer 
RS 
disposes of the problem of equiprobability of station of origin, as the train has the same 
probability of being at any station. We proceed to calculate the probability of the passenger making a 
correct guess if the destination of the train is station k.  We will assume that the RS is station 0; the proof 
will show that the computation is independent of the location of the RS, as long as it lies outside the 
minor arc between the two possible stations of origin.  We will assume that the station that precedes 
station k is station k-1 and the station that follows it is station k+1, where 3< k+1<N (this is assured 
by the choice of the RS). 
    Consider the following diagram, in which the stations are dots with accompanying station 
numbers.                                                                
                                                                              
                                                           k+1                   k+1     N 
                                                             k                                   0 
                                                           k-1                                1 
 
    Assuming equiprobability of arrival at station k, the probability of the passenger starting from 
station k-1 is ½.  If the passenger is at station k-1, the probability that the pointer points in the 
correct direction is  
                                                  pk + pk+1 + … + pN + p0 
So, the probability that the passenger is at station k-1, the destination is station k, and the pointer 
points in the correct direction (so that the passenger guesses correctly) is 
                                                     ½ (pk + pk+1 + … + pN + p0) 
Similarly, the probability of the passenger starting from station k+1 is ½.  If the passenger is at 
station k+1, the probability that the pointer points in the correct direction is  
                                                  pk+1 + pk + … + p1 
So, the probability that the passenger is at station k+1, the destination is station k, and the pointer 
points in the correct direction is 
                                                     ½ (pk+1 + pk + … + p1) 
Therefore, the probability that the destination is station k and the pointer points in the correct 
direction is  
                                            ½ (pk + pk+1 + … + pN + p0) + ½ (pk+1 + pk + … + p1) 
                                         = ½ (1 + pk + pk+1) 
as each term from p0 through pN appears at least once in the sum, and both pk and pk+1 appear 
twice. 
    Consequently, the probability that once the passenger knows the destination is station k, the 
probability that he will correctly guess the direction of approach is greater than ½.  Using the 
reasoning presented in Section 4, the passenger can guess the direction of approach to the 
destination with probability greater than ½ even before the destination is decided. 
    We can actually be a little more precise.  The probability that the passenger will correctly 
guess the direction from a randomly selected (with uniform probability) station can easily be 
computed as the average of the above quantities.  Since there are N+1 stations, the average is 
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since the sum from 0 to N of all the pk (or all the pk+1) is 1. 
Section 6 – Open Questions 
     (1) Is it possible to weaken the equiprobability hypothesis and still derive the conclusion that 
the passengers can correctly guess the outcome of the coin toss?      We believe that this can be 
done, from continuity considerations alone. 
      (2) Example 1 was constructed to try to exhibit a configuration in which the equiprobability 
hypothesis is automatically satisfied.  Are there other such configurations?  Can we simply 
mandate the existence of such configurations without the need to construct them, and if so, what 
does this say about the nature of the equiprobability hypothesis? 
    One possibility might be to consider a finite track consisting of N stations, with the end 
stations being viewed as reflecting barriers for a Markov chain.  It is easy to see that the steady-
state solution is that the two end stations have a probability of 1/(2N-2) of being the train’s 
destination, and the remaining N-2 stations each have a probability of 1/(N-1) of being the train’s 
destination.  Therefore, if we simply require the passenger to wake up only if the train is at least 
3 stations from an end of the line, the equiprobability condition is fulfilled. 
(3) Is it possible to modify or restrict the choice of pointer in such a way to improve the 
probability of successfully guessing the outcome of the toss? 
(4) Can the methods of this paper be used to improve the prediction of the outcome of a toss of a 
biased coin (one with heads probability different from ½)? 
Conclusion 
    One of the reasons for initially posting this on arXiv.org is to solicit help in unraveling what 
appears to the authors to be an extremely puzzling situation.  There is certainly the possibility 
that we have made some error in the argument, in which case we hope it will be corrected.  If the 
argument appears to be correct, we believe others will be in a better position than ourselves to 
assess the validity of  Example 1 and precisely what role the equiprobability hypothesis plays. 
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